adversarial training and robustness
Adversarial Training and Robustness for Multiple Perturbations
Defenses against adversarial examples, such as adversarial training, are typically tailored to a single perturbation type (e.g., small $\ell_\infty$-noise). For other perturbations, these defenses offer no guarantees and, at times, even increase the model's vulnerability. Our aim is to understand the reasons underlying this robustness trade-off, and to train models that are simultaneously robust to multiple perturbation types. We prove that a trade-off in robustness to different types of $\ell_p$-bounded and spatial perturbations must exist in a natural and simple statistical setting. We corroborate our formal analysis by demonstrating similar robustness trade-offs on MNIST and CIFAR10. We propose new multi-perturbation adversarial training schemes, as well as an efficient attack for the $\ell_1$-norm, and use these to show that models trained against multiple attacks fail to achieve robustness competitive with that of models trained on each attack individually. In particular, we find that adversarial training with first-order $\ell_\infty, \ell_1$ and $\ell_2$ attacks on MNIST achieves merely $50\%$ robust accuracy, partly because of gradient-masking. Finally, we propose affine attacks that linearly interpolate between perturbation types and further degrade the accuracy of adversarially trained models.
Reviews: Adversarial Training and Robustness for Multiple Perturbations
Originality: the paper is mostly original in considering the problem of robustness to multiple perturbation types. The trade-off between adversarial robustness to different norms and the definition of "affine attacks" has been also investigated for linear classifiers in: - A. Demontis, P. Russu, B. Biggio, G. Fumera, and F. Roli. In that paper, it is shown that while one can design an optimal classifier against one lp-norm attack, the same classifier will be vulnerable to the corresponding dual-norm attack (e.g., if one designs a robust classifier against l-inf attacks, it will be vulnerable to l1 attacks). In other words, it is shown that a proper regularizer can be the optimal response to a specific lp-norm attack. In the submitted paper, this phenomenon is stated in terms of mutually exclusive perturbations (MEPs) and shown for a toy Gaussian dataset.
Adversarial Training and Robustness for Multiple Perturbations
Defenses against adversarial examples, such as adversarial training, are typically tailored to a single perturbation type (e.g., small \ell_\infty -noise). For other perturbations, these defenses offer no guarantees and, at times, even increase the model's vulnerability. Our aim is to understand the reasons underlying this robustness trade-off, and to train models that are simultaneously robust to multiple perturbation types. We prove that a trade-off in robustness to different types of \ell_p -bounded and spatial perturbations must exist in a natural and simple statistical setting. We corroborate our formal analysis by demonstrating similar robustness trade-offs on MNIST and CIFAR10.
Adversarial Training and Robustness for Multiple Perturbations
Defenses against adversarial examples, such as adversarial training, are typically tailored to a single perturbation type (e.g., small $\ell_\infty$-noise). For other perturbations, these defenses offer no guarantees and, at times, even increase the model's vulnerability. Our aim is to understand the reasons underlying this robustness trade-off, and to train models that are simultaneously robust to multiple perturbation types. We prove that a trade-off in robustness to different types of $\ell_p$-bounded and spatial perturbations must exist in a natural and simple statistical setting. We corroborate our formal analysis by demonstrating similar robustness trade-offs on MNIST and CIFAR10.